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BIOGENETIC STRUCTURALISM. By Charles D. Laughlin, Jr., and Eugene G. D'Aquili.
Columbia University Press, New York, 1974. 211 pp. $10.00
Structuralism is a movement within the sciences of man holding that the order
which we are able to observe in the world is isomorphic with the order that obtains in
the observing mind. The correspondences that exist between world and mind are not
generally apparent from inspection, but require scrutiny into the "deep structure"
that underlies phenomena, a concept first propounded by Ferdinand De Saussure in
his analysis oflanguage. Social organizations, like myths and languages, are based on
transformations, evident at the surface, ofstructures ofwhich the bearers areuncon-
scious. The native speaker, accordingly, knows his language fully in his functional
competence, but may have no idea whatever of the rules, lexical, syntactic,
phonemic, which hold sway and which permit the infinite variety ofmanifestations of
speech.
The authors of this compact, persuasive, and yet also highly speculative study of
biogenetic structuralism propose that structure resides primarily in the brain, not in
a platonically conceived realm of"mind," and that in fact no psychic reality needs to
be inserted between the central nervous system and the environment. The principles
of organization of societies for which Levi-Strauss, for example, must postulate
mental universals are themselves the necessary derivatives ofcerebral structures at-
tained through evolutionary processes. The evidence for biogenetic structuralism
leans on evolutionary theory, which in turn helps to explain, as "orthodox" struc-
turalism does not, the variety of structures that exist and their modification over
periods oftime.
The evolution of hominid cognition depends on the development of ever greater
complexity ofdendritic-synaptic configurations and neural tracts, to a point ofquali-
tative change at the human level, in the associative capabilities ofthe brain. From the
findings of modern neurophysiology, Professors Laughlin and D'Aquili point to
various systems (including the visual-limbic, the visual-somaesthetic-motor, the
frontal-thalamic) and areas such as the parietal-occipital, which support the cere-
bral adaptive mechanisms peculiar to man. So, the system of connections between
the visual association areas and the limbic system probably provides "the mechanism
by which sustained affect of any sort is invested in objects as they are presented to
the visual cortex." The significance of such findings not only for imprinting in birds,
but for human attachments is evident.
Some of the neural associative structures are genetically programmed, such as
those underlying the universal stages in the acquisition of language. Probably most
are laid down early in the life of the individual, with physical alterations of cerebral
structure formed, as Pribram has suggested, according to holographic models, that
is, by recording in a neurophysiological medium over wide expanses ofthe brain, in-
formational content which is then available for cognitive and affective retrieval.
"Neurognostic" models of this kind are distinguished from one another by the total
field ofneural connections, not by particular cells and pathways.
The authors, who are themselves research workers in anthropology and psychiatry
at the University ofPennsylvania, offer a wide and interesting variety ofevidence for
neurognosis as the basis of structure. Neurophysiology aside, psychology, anthro-
pology, ethology, and linguistics also support the position that some ofour models of
reality are not learned according to classical definitions oflearning, but are based on
genetically determined neural models and structures. It is, moreover, highly likely
that such a fundamental structure as "binary opposition," of which Levi-Strauss,
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following the linguists, has made so much in his studies on social organization and
which is essential also to the explanation of the psychoanalytically interesting
dichotomy ofselfand other, seems to require the integrity ofthe area comprising the
inferior parietal lobe. Evidence is also at hand to support the proposal that there is a
localizable neurognostic structure governing the experienceofcausality.
The foregoing paragraphs summarize in barest outline Professors Laughlin and
D'Aquili's first five chapters, in which the evolutionary and neurophysiological back-
ground of their thinking is developed. The remaining four chapters apply this back-
ground to a variety of subjects, of which the most relevant to the psychiatrist and
psychoanalyst is the eighth, on "Psychopathology and Evolutionary Structuralism."
From the rather familiar ground of the genetics of schizophrenia, they proceed to
other aspects of psychosis and neurosis. The formulation ofdepression, for example,
in terms ofthe activation ofthe neurognostic structure that aligns selfto the world in
a negative fashion is appealing, if not fully convincing. Conversely, in another
chapter, the authors invoke the concept of inherited structure governing positive
alignment ofselfto objects to explain homosexuality.
It is at this point, when the authors extend their lines to psychopathology, the
reviewer's own field, that the arguments seem to run thin. Just as no one can in-
telligently deny the dependence of mental function on cerebral structure and organi-
zation, so it should be welcome to know more precisely the ways in which mental
function is mediated by the brain. But, as Jacques Lacan (a psychoanalyst with
strong structuralist leanings, who however is not cited in this work) remarked a long
time ago, the problem we have to contend with is the "structureofdetermination" it-
self. Even if we knew that all the structures which categorize symbolic processes
were definable in terms of neurophysiology, we should still have to look at the sym-
bolic processes themselves in their uniqueness to assign their relations with other
processes. The significance ofan element in a phobia can only be known, for example,
through its historical affiliations with other symbols, as revealed through
psychotherapeutic discourse. So, too, I should expect that with the most complete
mapping of cerebral systems and processes, we should still have to look within the
symbolic, ultimately mental data of structural anthropology to account for
transformations ofsocial organization.
This is to say that the authors have yielded to the imperialism of natural science.
Since, but for this weakness, we might not have what is in all other respects a most
valuable effort, the exaggeration ofthe biological theme is pardonable.
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THE MAMMALIAN KIDNEY. BIOLOGICAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION. By D. B.
Moffat. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975. viii, 263 pp. $24.95.
This book is part of a series on "Biological Structure and Function" and its aim is
to synthesize renal anatomy, physiology, and biochemistry into a manageable
volume. It is, however, a synthesis heavily weighted towards anatomy; the author
confesses at the outset that he is "deeply conscious of my deficiencies as a
physiologist" and has therefore emphasized "those aspects of renal physiology to
which structural studies are relevant." There is virtually no treatment ofthe specific